Monday, December 22, 2008

China Closes the Clean-Coal Gap

Wednesday, December 17, 2008

China Closes the Clean-Coal Gap

The United States and China are both focusing on technologies to clean up coal power.

By Peter Fairley --- technologyreview.com

China looks set to overtake the United States in the application of technologies to clean up coal-fired power generation, if several proposed projects come to fruition. GreenGen--a joint venture established by Chinese utilities--has broken ground on China's first integrated gasification combined cycle (IGCC) plant and signed agreements to build two more.

At the same time IGCC is stalled in the US. In February, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) canceled an advanced IGCC technology demonstration project called FutureGen, and climate concerns have paralyzed all but one of 30-plus IGCC projects proposed by U.S. utilities since 2000.

Future power: An artist’s concept of China’s first integrated gasification combined cycle (IGCC) plant, which is being constructed in LinGang Industrial Park in the Tianjin Binhai New Development Zone. 
Credit: GreenGen

GreenGen is now the most advanced project of its kind in the world, according to Ming Sung, Beijing-based Asia/Pacific representative for the Clean Air Task Force, a nonprofit environmental consulting firm based in Boston. "They are ahead because they have completed engineering [and] design, major equipment is selected and on order, and site preparation and foundation [work] has begun," says Ming.

The oil and gas giant BP reinforced China's position as a clean-coal technology leader last month, by establishing a $73 million research center in Shanghai with the Chinese Academy of Sciences to help commercialize technologies such as carbon capture and storage (CCS) and gasification. In another sign of the country's suddenly bold role in green technology, China's battery giant BYD launched the world's first mass-produced plug-in hybrid vehicle yesterday.

Underpinning China's potential leadership in carbon-neutral coal power is broad expertise with gasification. By 2010, China will have installed 29 gasification projects since 2004, compared with zero in the United States, according to the Gasification Technologies Council, a trade group based in Arlington, VA. Most of these Chinese projects turn coal into synthesis gas (or syngas)--a blend of carbon monoxide and hydrogen--to feed catalysts that synthesize chemicals and fuels. IGCC technology uses the same syngas to drive turbines and generate electricity with far less pollution than conventional coal plants. For example, mercury and soot levels are close to those seen at natural gas-fired plants, while carbon dioxide comes out in a pure stream that should be easier to capture and sequester.

Until recently, Chinese power firms ignored IGCC technology because conventional coal plants are cheaper to build and operate. But Guodong Sun, a technology policy expert at New York's Stony Brook University, says that GreenGen and a few other IGCC projects are gathering momentum thanks to a blend of government incentives, tighter environmental regulation, and emerging concern for corporate self-image among China's leading power producers. Sun says that GreenGen, for example, is important to the national government as a symbol of homegrown Chinese technology.

The project plans to start up a 250-megawatt IGCC plant in Tianjin in 2010 using a novel gasifier designed by the Thermal Power Research Institute in Xi'an; the plant will also supply some syngas and heat to local chemical plants. GreenGen plans to catapult the output of the gasifier design, from a 36-tons-per-day pilot plant, directly to commercial scale of 2,000 tons per day.

And GreenGen is already preparing to scale up further: in April, GreenGen and Tianjin officials signed an agreement for two 400-megawatt IGCC units. Meanwhile, Chinese utility firm Huaneng, GreenGen's majority stakeholder, started up a CCS pilot project at its Beijing coal power plant this summer.

While municipal air-quality concerns support GreenGen's plans, Sun says that they are central to another IGCC project that he believes will be built: a 200-megawatt IGCC plant in Hangzhou proposed by Chinese utility company Huadian Power International. "For the Huadian project, the most important factor is sulfur dioxide and acid-rain regulations," says Sun. "SO2emissions are capped in Hangzhou, and . . . IGCC is an excellent solution."

Both GreenGen and the Huadian project receive a small amount of financial support from China's Ministry of Science and Technology, which Sun says carries important prestige for the utilities involved: "These government grants recognize their technology leadership, and mean much more [than cash] to Chinese companies."

Ming of the Clean Air Task Force explains how the utilities involved rationalize the investment in more expensive IGCC technology even with slim government funding. He says that, while China's electricity sector is technically deregulated, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) still has final say over the tariffs that new power plants will earn per megawatt-hour supplied. It can therefore adjust the tariffs to ensure a reasonable rate of return for projects that respond to local or national interests, enabling the utilities to experiment.

However, NDRC control also slow IGCC's progress if political will weakens. Ming acknowledges that NDRC may be less willing to approve projects that impose higher costs on consumers, in light of the current economic crisis.

James Childress, executive director of the Gasification Technologies Council, argues that projects like GreenGen are largely political. "They are doing it to put a better face on what is mostly just a 'Burn coal and don't worry about it' policy," he says. "In the current economic climate, I can't imagine there being a drive to do anything seriously on CO2."

As for IGCC's prospects in the United States, Duke Energy's 630-megawatt IGCC project at Edwardsport, IN, is the only one going forward nationwide. This is because it provides a means of using Indiana's high sulfur coal, which produces too much pollution to be used in conventional plants. All the other IGCC proposals are caught up in a moratorium on new coal power imposed by state environment and utility regulators wary of the climate change and the economic impact of carbon emissions.

Last year, for example, Tampa Electric postponed plans for a commercial IGCC unit in Florida adjacent to an already operating demonstration unit built with DOE support in the 1990s after the state announced a climate-change plan.

Right now, the coal and utility firms supporting the FutureGen project are looking to president-elect Obama to jumpstart their project and others; they reinforced their commitment to the project this week by purchasing a $6.5 million site for it in Illinois. Childress, however, expresses little hope for rapid action. "Wind, solar, biomass, and other renewables have a bigger seat at the table right now," he says.

Childress predicts that coal gasification will eventually flourish in the United States, but as "stealth coal" rather than as IGCC. He says that utilities will use gasification technology to generate synthetic natural gas to keep gas plants running. "I call it stealth coal because one way or another, we're going to need more gas," he says. "If you can't put coal into the front end of a plant making electricity, they're going to put it into the front end of a plant making natural gas."

RFID's Security Problem

January/February 2009

RFID's Security Problem

Are U.S. passport cards and new state driver's licenses with RFID truly secure?

By Erica Naone --- technologyreview.com

Starting this summer, Americans will need passports to travel to Canada, Mexico, Bermuda, and the Caribbean--unless they have passport cards or one of the enhanced driver's licenses that the states of Washington and New York have begun to issue.

Valid only for trips by land and sea, these new forms of identification are a convenient, inexpensive option for people who don't need to travel by plane. U.S. passport cards, which were introduced in July, cost about half as much as a full passport, and the extra cost of getting an enhanced driver's license rather than a regular one is even lower. Enhanced licenses have been available in Washington since January 2008 and in New York since September; other border states, including Michi gan, Vermont, and Arizona, intend to offer them as well.

Credit: Harry Campbell
New York Enhanced Driver's License
$30 fee, added to the cost of a driver’s license 
www.nydmv.state.ny.us/edl-main.htm

Washington State Enhanced Driver's License
$15 fee, added to the cost of a driver’s license
www.dol.wa.gov/about/news/priorities/edl.html

U.S. Passport Cards
$45
travel.state.gov/passport/ppt_card/ppt_card_ 3926.html

But not everyone is convinced that the new IDs are a good idea. The passport card and the enhanced licenses contain radio frequency identification (RFID) tags, which are microchips fitted with antennas. An RFID reader can radio a query to the tag, causing it to return the data it contains--in this case, an identification number that lets customs agents retrieve information about the cardholder from a government database. The idea is that instant access to biographical data, a photo, and the results of terrorist and criminal background checks will help agents move people through the border efficiently. RFID technology, however, has been raising privacy concerns since it was introduced in product labels in the early 2000s.

Meanwhile, although experts say that some RFID technologies are quite secure, a University of Virginia security researcher's analysis of the NXP Mifare Classic (see Hack, November/December 2008), an RFID chip used in fare cards for the public- transit systems of Boston, London, and other cities, has shown that the security of smart cards can't be taken for granted. "I think we are in the growing-pains phase," says Johns Hopkins University computer science professor Avi Rubin, a security and privacy researcher. "This happens with a lot of technologies when they are first developed."

Borderline Security
The first of the new ID cards to be introduced, the federal passport cards and the Washington driver's licenses use similar technology, which has been reviewed and approved by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. The cards' RFID devices, called electronic product code (EPC) tags, are much like bar codes. The tags are inexpensive and can, in ideal conditions, be read from about 150 feet away--an unusually long range for RFID, says Ari Juels, director and chief scientist at RSA Laboratories in Bedford, MA, which collaborated with researchers from the University of Washington to evaluate both cards.

Although the cards don't store personal information, the researchers concluded that even storing a unique number raises some privacy concerns. "If you think about the Social Security number, at some point there could have been an argument that it's just a number, not personal information," says Tadayoshi Kohno, an assistant professor of computer science at the University of Washington, who participated in the study. "But numbers evolve over time, and uses evolve over time, and eventually these things can reveal more information than we initially expect." What's more, relatively common RFID readers, such as those used for inventory control, could under some circumstances read the cards' numbers from quite a distance. The researchers felt there was a risk that the cards could be used to track people, the way a few shopping centers in Britain have used signals from cell phones to track customers' shopping habits and monitor how long they stay in stores. Although people carry other cards and devices that could also be used for tracking, the researchers note that the identification cards can be read at longer range than many other RFID tags and that people are likely to carry them at all times, while they might leave, say, their cell phones at home. And regular U.S. passports, which also contain RFID chips, use technology that makes privacy problems less likely. Passports, unlike passport cards, must be read from up close, and they have a security system that requires an official to optically scan characters from the document in order to gain access to the personal data stored in the chip.

Gigi Zenk, a spokesperson for the Washington State Department of Licensing, says that Washington has made it illegal for third parties to use data from RFID tags without the tag owners' consent. She and other officials add that anyone concerned about privacy can use the privacy sleeves provided with the cards, which are designed to block radio signals so that the cards are harder to read surreptitiously. But the Washington study showed that the sleeves didn't always work: they didn't block radio signals when crumpled, for instance. The researchers also argued that most people are unlikely to use the sleeves, anyway. Even some privacy researchers Juels consulted confessed to having lost them, he says.

And privacy isn't the only issue here: the researchers say that unauthorized reading would threaten border security as well. If it's easy to get the identification number out of the cards, then it's relatively easy to counterfeit them, simply by loading a stolen ID number onto a blank, off-the-shelf chip. If each RFID chip also had a unique, hardwired serial number, which had to correspond to the stored ID number, it would be harder to counterfeit. But neither the Washington licenses nor the passport cards have that extra security feature.

The Washington cards are open to one additional type of attack: EPC tags can be disabled when a reader issues a "kill" command. Although each tag is designed to be protected by a PIN that allows only authorized users to issue the command, the state never set the PIN on the cards it distributed, allowing anyone with an RFID reader to set it himself and commence killing cards. If a good number of Washingtonians with enhanced licenses were gathered at a border crossing, someone could cause a disruption by killing large numbers of cards. An attacker could also use this tactic to harass particular individuals, since a killed card is likely to draw suspicion.

Juels is quick to note that the cards won't be the only thing protecting the border. "If border agents do all that they're supposed to do [including, for example, comparing the photographs stored in the database with those printed on the ID], they should be able to detect counterfeits," he says. He adds, however, that it's human nature to become less vigilant when there's tech nology to lean on.

When I asked the Department of Homeland Security about these concerns, press secretary Laura Keehner responded with a statement that said, in part, "While the risks described in the University of Washington/RSA paper may be technically possible, we believe that many are ­improbable, and even if realized, would have little impact other than causing an individual traveler minor inconvenience at the border. ... As we identify additional mitigation strategies, we will continue to strengthen requirements for ... cross-border travel documents in order to both enhance border security and privacy of the document holder."

The New York License, and Beyond
No independent researcher has yet published an evaluation of New York's enhanced driver's license, but the card avoids some of the concerns raised about the federal and Washington cards. The chips in the New York licenses have serial numbers to protect them against counterfeiting, and their memory banks have been locked to protect them against unauthorized use of commands. It's admirable that Homeland Security and the states it's working with are willing to make use of better technologies than they chose at first. But it's not clear whether these efforts will go far enough.

The New York licenses present the same privacy issues that the other cards do, and as Keehner's comments suggest, officials have a tendency to dismiss such concerns--which could very well mean that nothing will be done about them. Yet surely it's possible to protect the privacy of cardholders without requiring them to keep track of privacy sleeves. For example, says Avi Rubin, each card could be fitted with a button that allows the user to control when to send information. Unless the button was pushed in, the ID wouldn't respond to queries. Such cards would cost a bit more, but they could offer more security as well as more privacy.

As long as the remaining problems are ignored, though, it's unlikely that the technology will become good enough to protect international borders without compromising the privacy of thousands or millions of people. Tadayoshi Kohno, for one, says that at this point, he is not convinced that RFID even offers security advantages over the old IDs. Technology used on this scale, and for purposes this important, should be clearly better than what it's replacing: the U.S. experience with electronic voting systems shows what can happen when it's not. If officials continue to advocate band-aids such as privacy sleeves rather than working to address the full extent of critics' concerns, they will ultimately undermine the very technology that they hope to promote. While new ID technology seems likely to stay, it could become a fiasco if officials don't pay attention to the work of hackers and security researchers. These people try to expose weaknesses before they can be exploited maliciously. It's much less painful to swallow the news from them than to wait until a problem becomes embarrassing--or devastating.

Erica Naone is a Technology Review assistant editor.

Sunday, December 21, 2008

Trefferkönig Google

NTERNET | 18.12.2008

Trefferkönig Google

 

Google leitet sich ab von dem Kunstwort "Googol", mit dem der amerikanische Mathematiker Edward Kasner die unvorstellbar große Zahl 10 hoch 100 (eine 1 mit 100 Nullen) bezeichnet hat. Sind Macht und Reichtum des Unternehmens inzwischen genauso unvorstellbar groß?

Google ist eines der erfolgreichsten Unternehmen unserer Zeit. Die Einnahmen der 1998 von Larry Page und Sergey Brin gegründeten Konzerns stammen zumeist von Portalen, welche die Google-Suchtechnik für ihre eigenen Dienste übernehmen. Eine zweite Einnahmequelle ist die Werbung. Gezahlt wird für die optisch hervorgehobene Platzierung in den Google-Trefferlisten.

Das DW-WORLD-Dossier gibt einen Überblick über die wirtschaftlichen und multimedialen Aspekte des Phänomens Google.

 

Impact Of RFID On Manufacturing Analyzed

Impact Of RFID On Manufacturing Analyzed

IndustryWeek (1/1, Blanchard) reports, "As manufacturers come to accept the inevitability of RFID (radio frequency identification), they are also discovering some tangible benefits." The article notes applications of the technology by retailers and manufacturers such as Wal-Mart and Boeing, and notes that in some situations a company's RFID "mandate led to various reactions remarkably similar to the classic stages of grief," including denial, anger, bargaining and depression. "It remains to be seen how many manufacturers will eventually reach the final stage, acceptance." Even so, "RFID has become a significant business," with many "consumer goods manufacturers...implementing or evaluating RFID 'to track assets, gain better visibility of manufacturing and supply chain operations, and improve product and service quality.'" The article notes the benefits and drawbacks to RFID use in different industries, and adds, "Ultimately, companies finding their own benefits from RFID tend to be well ahead of companies dragged kicking and screaming into mandated initiatives."